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ECOSYSTEM POLICY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF POWER 
By Warren ]. Samuels"" 
The purpose of ecological policy is to introduce environmental 
considerations into human decision making so as to protect the 
environment, which is really to say, so as to protect mankind against 
environmental disasters and to enable man to live in a comfortable 
symbiotic relation with his metabolic and physical environment. 
The thrust of ecological concern is that man has abused and dam-
aged his environment in ways and to an extent that can only further 
redound to damage man's own well-being. Man should instead 
think out the ecological implications of his behavior and adjust his 
activities so as to reflect environmental considerations and to in-
flict the minimum damage, especially the minimum irreversible 
damage, on his environment. The result of this current position has 
been a widespread call for the design and management of environ-
mental protection systems. Such suggested solutions have varied 
extensively, and include the mandatory imposition of waste dis-
posal, the creation of pollution rights as a new subset of property 
rights, the creation of new organizations and institutions, citizen 
education, and so on. 
The purpose of this article is to suggest that there are certain 
analytical problems involved in the coupling or integration of 
ecological and social factors and therefore in the design and man-
agement of environmental or ecological systems. These are prob-
lems which have beset the social sciences qua sciences and the 
application of social science to questions of social policy (whether 
or not ecological problems were considered, and whether or not 
the social scientist was aware of them), and which severely constrain 
the ecologist both in his analysis and in his policy recommenda-
tions. These are problems consequent to the ultimate choice char-
acter of social and ecological life. 
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I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. The making of social policy and the solution of social, and 
now ecological, problems involves the process of making choices 
from a smaller or larger set of alternatives. In this decision making 
process there is a quest for definitive and authoritative answers and 
solutions. But these answers and solutions, whatever else one 
can say about them, are adopted primarily because they are accep-
table to whomever is in a decision making position. Absolute and 
conclusive answers and solutions are hard to come by, although 
we may try to convince ourselves differently. Actually there 
exists a process of value articulation, juxtaposition, confronta-
tion, and selection on an on-going basis with each participant in 
the decision making process looking at his own thoughts and 
feelings and at the findings of others. Thus, for example, pri-
vate labor and commercial arbitrators-and ombudsmen of all 
kinds-look to the courts for precedents, rules of procedure, 
formulas for composing conflicts, and leads in the substantive 
balancing or relative equities and hardships; and the courts 
similarly look to commercial and labor arbitrators for similar in-
sight into conflict resolution. Both groups are chasing their own 
tails, so to speak, in the process of hammering out the working 
rules and choices by which we live. The quest for definitive and 
authoritative answers and solutions, important from the points 
of view of motivation and legislation, is deceptive. Decisions, an-
swers, and solutions are worked out in the process of living, in and 
through interaction. 
2. In one respect the argument of this article centers upon and 
emphasizes the complexity of choice and decision making in the 
real world and its relevance to ecosystem policy and the design and 
management of ecological systems. I therefore have the dilemma 
of having to choose between analysis and argument that overdoes 
the complexity and thereby burdens communication and the 
reader, and analysis and argument which oversimplifies the com-
plexity and thereby defeats my purpose. I can only caution the 
reader that the construction of the paper involves an imperfect 
balance between these two considerations. 
3. The reader, if I may anticipate some reactions to the article, 
may respond that the coupling of ecological and social factors 
in the design and management of environmental systems is either 
not as complicated or more complicated than I make it out to be. 
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I can only assert here that the coupling of ecological and social 
factors is as complicated as I suggest and even more so. In partial 
elaboration, let me say that there are answers and solutions to eco-
logical problems which can and do "work," but the fact that they 
do "work" does not obviate the complexity that is avoided or short-
circuited by particular answers and solutions. Each answer or 
solution to a particular problem of environmental protection in 
effect involves a choice from among a set of alternatives. This set 
has to be understood within a very large and typically open-ended 
matrix of social variables (discussed in Part II); it presumes some 
position on the fundamental analytical problems to be posed in 
this article. A similar situation exists, for example, in the analysis 
of ideology: almost any ideology can serve as a source of "efficient" 
answers to particular policy issues, i.e., a source of solutions to 
problems that "work." (Actually the "efficiency" is misleading: no 
ideology provides a complete and conclusive calculus by which to 
generate solutions, each solution rather being in fact a result of 
an act of choice or imagination within the ideology-as is partially 
evidenced by the fact that different true believers often come 
up with different solutions while each profess to apply the same 
ideology. Ideologies are frameworks channeling but also ac-
commodating different chains of reasoning. But while an ide-
ology is seemingly able to provide a "ready made" solution, that 
solution has meaning only insofar as the ideology (or the particular 
chain of reasoning on which the solution rests) resolves or takes a 
position on a complex matrix of social variables and values as well 
as on the fundamental analytical problems developed below. More-
over, ideology may provide efficiently forthcoming answers but not 
efficiently functioning or conclusively desirable solutions to prob-
lems. The same point applies to schools of thought, say, in eco-
nomics: each tends to provide insight and direction to solutions to 
problems only on its own terms, within, that is, the terms of its own 
paradigm, thereby avoiding the complexity represented by the 
terms of rival paradigms. 
4. Most discussions of ecological or environmental policy are 
partial in that they are limited to only a subset of the total number 
of variables actually relevant, and normative in that they are pre-
mised upon particular operative values and aim at particular 
policy solutions to problems to the exclusion of other values and 
solutions. I will discuss partial versus general interdependence in 
Part II; here I wish to stress the importance of positive analysis. The 
ECOSYSTEM POLICY AND POWER 583 
position of most environmentalists, for example, as to the Alaskan 
North Shore depends in part upon insight which they have as 
ecologists, zoologists, etc., and in part upon particular value choices 
they make or value positions they hold as to the priority of consid· 
erations that should govern the use of the region. I do not in the 
least denigrate these normative approaches: they are a necessary and 
important part of the process of value articulation, juxtaposition, 
confrontation and selection that is central to social life and which 
embodies man's quest for the meaning of human dignity, subsum-
ing considerations of justice, ethics, and the place of man in his 
natural environment and his relation to other creatures. I do in-
sist, however, that the coupling of ecological and social factors is 
normative and involves normative considerations. Some environ-
mentalists tend to state their case in such a way as if ecological facts 
eschew the opportunity for social choice. This is not typically the 
case: usually there is both the opportunity and the burden of social 
choice. (The environmentalist who so states his case is most likely 
functioning to have the social choice be his implicit choice. En-
vironmentalists, like economists, disagree.) Paradoxically, however, 
I urge, and premise this article upon, the importance of an objective 
or positivist approach to what is a normative (choices of values as 
to alternative uses of the environment) and positive (determination 
of objective sceintific data concerning the environment) matter. I 
suggest, broadly speaking, the importance of a positive approach 
which will: first, provide hard scientific knowledge as a basis for 
social choice; second, unveil the policy alternatives between which 
trade-offs exist; and third, identify the fundamental problems with 
respect to which each normative solution is but one approach. In 
this article I attempt a contribution to the third area, the identifica-
tion of fundamental problems. I stress that the ultimate problem in 
the design and management of environmental protection systems 
involves determining the normative matter of what should be done; 
but here I want to treat that in a positive way. Society will reach and 
work out solutions to ecological problems; here I want to explore 
what is involved as society works out its solutions and the funda-
mental analytical problems involved-in a positive, objective 
manner. Nothing developed here will necessarily apply for or 
against any particular environmental policy or reform; but the 
fundamental problems on which all environmental policies must 
take some position will be developed. Those policies will be better 
informed if we understand the fundamental problems involved. 
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II. GENERAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
The primary fact of all social life is the interdependence of all 
variables. The interdependencies are not homogeneous but all 
social variables are in one way or another interdependent. All 
schools of economic, political, and sociological thought recognize 
this general interdependence, but just as economic, political and 
sociological thought each takes for its domain a more or less am-
biguous subset of partial interdependencies, each school within 
each discipline tends to emphasize a particular set of variables or 
a particular set of (partial) interdependencies.1 General interde-
pendence is acknowledged but inter- and intra-disciplinary special-
ization tends to result in partial-interdependence models; one 
reason for this is the limited capacity of the human brain and the 
need for the reduction of variables to a manageable number. 
Given social life as a system of general interdependence, the 
fundamental problem is that of order, defined as the reconciling of 
freedom and control, or autonomy and coordination including 
hierarchy and equality, with continuity and change. This is the 
dual problem of organizing and reorganizing the human decision 
making process and of making and remaking and effectuating de-
CISIons. 
The continuing social resolution of the problem of order has to 
be understood as taking place in a dynamic general-interdepen-
dence system and with general-interdependence characteristics. Let 
me elaborate first by identifying several dual sets of representative 
and important partial relationships: 
a. the working rules of law and morals govern the distribution and 
exercise of power and the distribution and exercise of power 
governs the development of the working rules; 
b. values depend upon the decision making process and the decision 
making process depends upon values; 
c. tastes and preferences depend upon the institutional structure and 
the institutional structure depends upon tastes and preferences; 
d. the opportunity set of an individual depends upon the total 
structure of power and the total structure of power depends 
upon the decisions made by individuals from within their op-
portunity sets at any point in time and over time; and 
e. the distribution of income and wealth depends upon the use 
made of government and the use made of government depends 
upon income and wealth distribution. 
Second, let me enumerate some of the variables which are part of 
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the system of general interdependence: individual choice, power 
structure, opportunity set structure, working rules, allocation of 
resources, distribution of income, government, value system, prefer-
ence structures, and so on. Third, let me baldly state that social 
policy may be understood and analyzed as the result of the inter-
action of the three dimensions of power, knowledge, and psychol-
ogy; and that running through all three arc the forces of technol-
ogy, power play, material and ideal preferences functions, and, inter 
alia, the combination of choice, choice processes, and power struc-
ture. Finally, let me say that society involves a number of some-
times competing and conflicting and sometimes reenforcing social 
control systems, such as the market, religion, law, and custom; and, 
moreover, that one critical characteristic of social control institu-
tions is that they are also power players, e.g., church versus state, 
business versus state. 
The foregoing paragraphs constitute an abbreviated overview 
of what is involved in the problem of order under the condition of 
general interdependence. Even this cursory overview indicates the 
difficulty of a limited grasp of a system characterized by an infinite 
open-ended complexity and general interdependence. The di-
lemma of systems-analytic approaches vis-a.-vis marginal- or in-
cremental-analytic approaches resides in the tendency of the former 
to neglect important partial-interdependencies and of the latter to 
neglect the burden of general-interdependencies. Even though I am 
stressing here the importance of a general-interdependence ap-
proach, I must acknowledge that partial-interdependence ap-
proaches, despite the fact that they are always incomplete, possessed 
of tautological elements, and often excessively presumptuous, 
are nevertheless inescapable and useful. We do not yet and perhaps 
never will have a completely specified theory of general interde-
pendence-but we must bear in mind, more than we have in the 
past, the general interdependence nature of our problems. 
This means that any positive analysis of ecological cum social 
systems must differentiate between models which prescribe or pro-
scribe particular policies, these being normative models, and posi-
tive models which identify critical variables, identify critical 
alternatives and tradeoffs, and study how society chooses between 
alternatives. Specifically, this latter means that the ecologist who 
is interested in introducing environmental considerations into 
human decision making must be concerned with how society does 
handle ecologically "sensible" considerations, with how society 
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does form working rules and rights concerning the adoption of 
ecologically "sensible" considerations, and most especially with the 
role of social structure and economic-interest groups (power struc-
ture in toto) in determining just what substantive content is to 
be accorded "sensible," and, as discussed in Part III, just what costs 
are to be recognized as costs. 
A systems-analytic ecology concerned with the design and man-
agement of environmental systems is both a science and a policy 
discipline. As a policy discipline it necessarily confronts what I 
shall call the dilemma of design and evaluation: the design (and 
management) of environmental systems depends upon evaluation, 
yet evaluation depends upon the (decisional) system designed. One 
question is, where does the analyst start; another question, upon 
which I shall concentrate here, is, whose evaluation and whose 
design? The analyst is a participant-observer and his partial-inde-
pendence models and theories are themselves part of a general-inter-
dependence system. In everything he does, the analyst will be 
taking some position on evaluation and design. The problem is: 
whose choices are to be made operational either in design or in 
evaluation; or, which costs are to count; or, who is to count and for 
how much? The actual social solutions to these equivalent queries 
depend upon the complex general-interdependence system (in-
cluding the interplay of power players and psychic states within the 
market, between the market and other institutions, and in regard 
to institutional development). General interdependence ultimately, 
however, is a grand process of choice, and the critical questions are 
the three equivalent queries just posed. When the ecologist wants 
the consideration of environmental factors to be conjoined with 
other aspects of social choice, when he wants to foster the design 
and management of ecological systems, he is ineluctably getting in-
volved in the problem of whose choices are to count, a problem 
which in actuality is only worked out through the complex and 
dynamic processes of social choice and whose solution cannot 
readily be taken for granted without begging the question of eco-
logical optimality which is ultimately a result of general-interde-
pendence interaction. Ecological optimality, like economic 
optimality, substantively depends upon whose choices are to count, 
that is, who is to count and for how much. The design of environ-
mental systems, the evaluation of environmental systems, and the 
selection of ecological alternatives and tradeoffs all depend upon 
some antecedent determination of who is to count. The following 
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two sections discuss the two most important types of cases in which 
this problem arises in ecosystem policy.2 
III. THE PROBLEM OF COSTS 
All persons concerned with ecosystem policy appreciate the need 
to consider costs in designing and managing as well as evaluating 
environmental systems. Economists, for example, have long insisted 
that the ecological issue is not pollution versus no pollution but 
the efficient or optimal amount of pollution given consideration of 
all cost factors, and that "excess" pollution is the result of using the 
waste disposal capacity of the environment too often free of charge, 
that is, without adequate attribution of costs to polluters. But what 
is the nature and origin of the "costs" so contemplated? I argue in 
this section that with prices dependent upon demand and supply, 
and with the seller's price being the buyer's cost, that the structure 
of costs is the obverse of the structure of prices; that with prices 
(and therefore costs) being dependent upon demand and supply, 
prices (and therefore costs) depend upon the forces and institutions 
operating through demand and supply; that there is thus no such 
thing as "absolute" costs (or prices) but only the costs which happen 
to be registered in the market through equilibrium or other prices; 
that costs (and prices) are partially dependent upon the structure 
of rights giving effect to the extant solution to the question of who 
is to count (as a cost factor to others) and how much, such that costs 
(and prices) are specific to a given structure of power (based, in 
part, on legal rights), among other factors. 
What are normally considered as "costs" are in fact a comming-
ling of several different things, and none of them is substantively 
an "absolute" either in economic relevance or magnitude. The 
closest one can come to an example of an absolute cost is the use of 
a nonrenewable natural resource. But even here the short run 
(and to an extent even the long run) market price associated here-
with depends upon numerous demand and supply factors, such as 
substitutability; furthermore, some of them do not carry prices at 
all-this is one of the causes of overuse of many bodies of water and 
the air space for waste disposal. 
One type of "cost" certainly includes real or physical input costs 
of production, given by technology and related factors. It takes 
steel to make an automobile and the steel is a cost factor. Waste dis-
posal from steel manufacture and electricity production, both used 
in the production of automobiles, is likewise a conventional cost 
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factor, though it has some of the characteristics of an output or joint 
product. 
Another type of "cost" involves the property and other rights 
which partially govern whose values and interests are to be made 
a cost to others and how much, which is to say, the weighting of 
persons and interests as to who has to be bought off (paid for) so 
that production can proceed. If persons do not have a right to 
something that others want for use in production, then their in-
terests will not count as a cost to the others; if they do have some-
thing that has to be paid for (i.e., a claim to income based on the 
right to have their consent secured in order that their something 
be used in production, or their consent as a prerequisite to pro-
duction), then they will enter as a cost factor. This is the case with 
owners of land and natural resources generally, with owners of 
copyrighted material, and with owners of property that cannot be 
freely polluted without their consent. The converse is true in the 
absence of rights-holders to navigable streams and the air space. 
Costs (prices) generated in the market reflect the commingling of 
both types of factors-real input costs and rights-as both influ-
ence the opportunity-set array of alternatives available at any point 
in time and over time to producers or potential producers. Those 
organizing production select, from the opportunity set of factor-
combination possibilities given by their technical production 
functions, on the basis of alternative unit costs of production. One 
of the factors governing unit costs of production is technology, 
including economies of scale and so on. Another factor is the cost-
price structure in the market with regard to those things which 
producers must pay for (the price of those things which they do not 
have to pay for is nonetheless subject to the following discussion). 
This cost-price structure (even when the price or cost is zero be-
cause someone else's interests are not given effect in the price-
costing process) depends upon the usual array of demand and supply 
factors, but specifically upon the requirements of physical costs 
imposed by technology and the structure of rights in the market. 
The structure of rights in the market in turn is partially dependent 
upon the structure of power, in a system of general interdependence 
in which it is true both that rights are a function of power and that 
power is a function of rights (see above). This is to say that those 
who have greater power can get legal identification, assignment 
and protection of their interests, now called rights, as opposed to 
those with lesser power. If copyright owners can require (because of 
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legal rights given them) a fee for permission to copy, then users of 
copying machines will face a cost of their production which would 
not otherwise (or not otherwise directly) accrue to them. Similarly, 
the distribution of wealth and income, together with other factors, 
governs relative costs in the market, and the cost-price structure 
would tend to be different if redistribution took place or were as-
sumed. (More generally, income and wealth distribution partially 
depends upon the cost-price structure and the cost-price structure 
partially depends upon income and wealth distribution-another 
facet of the general interdependence system.) Thus cost-benefit 
calculations using the existing cost-price structure give effect to 
and reenforce the existing power structure which generates the 
cost-price structure, valuing highly those interests accommodated 
by the power and rights structures and valuing lowly those not so 
accommodated. 
The point is that there is no such thing as absolute costs. Actual 
market costs are specific to the pattern of demand and supply in 
which they originate or have market-clearing and resource-alloca-
tion meaning, including the pattern of preferences, technological 
substitution, cross-elasticities of substitution, structure of rights, 
and so on, all of which are subject to change so that all prices and 
costs are only temporary magnitudes along an ongoing path of 
pricing. The costs involved in the actual economy are highly con-
tingent costs; they are both dependent and independent variables 
in a system of general interdependence and, moreover, are subject 
to many lag and other effects. Costs, like prices, only reflect the 
constellation of factors which happen to be given effect at that time 
or through time. There is no more intrinsic meaning to costs than 
to the prices which are their obverse. Costs and prices are only the 
result of episodic real-world algorithms. 
Costs, then, must be seen as having a general interdependence 
character. They are dependent upon tastes, power structure, tech-
nology (itself a range of alternatives in each instance), and rights 
structure. At any point of time only some of the possible acknowl-
edged "costs" may be registered in the market (or on cost-benefit 
worksheets): not all social costs are accrued by the imposers as 
private costs of production (the traditional Pigovian case of mar-
ket failure); and not all costs are perceived and become institution-
alized (the Federal Reserve System has long been more sensitive 
to the "costs" of inflation rather than the "costs" of unemploy-
ment). The range of "costs," meaning adverse impact upon some-
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one's opportunity set or interests, of most if not all acts of 
production are very great, though often with different degrees of 
proximity to the situs and time of production-this latter having 
a bearing upon the differential perception of such adverse impact 
as "costs." 
The economy involves an ubiquitous incidence of costs and also 
an ubiquitous shifting (or attempts at shifting) of costs and acquisi-
tion of benefits. The critical problem is who is to bear costs, or 
whose interests are to count as costs to others-this is the distribu-
tive problem, over time, both within and between societies. Eco-
logical analysis, and ecosystem design and management, involve 
the devising of pricing systems to register environmental costs and 
of reward systems to protect the environment; but the critical 
issues are: which reward system, which pattern of environmental 
costs and benefits, and which pattern of ecological tradeoffs? Given 
that there are typically varying patterns of environmental use, and 
therefore complex sets of ecological tradeoffs, not only does eco-
system policy confront a cost-price structure generated in the rest 
of the economy that provides only system- or situation-specific 
contingent prices and costs, but the very selection of particular 
patterns of environmental use, of particular tradeoffs, will affect 
the particular costs involved and affect them typically in very 
complex and different ways, that is, generate very different cost 
patterns. If "costs" are used as a partial-interdependence sub-
stitute for direct choice in ecosystem policy making, it should be 
remembered that they themselves are only existentially contingent 
and episodic phenomena; "costs" are a partial product of and 
therefore surrogate for the rights structure and other variables 
that enter into their making and which thereby indirectly but no 
less importantly govern the choices made by using those "costs." 
One way or another, choices between alternative environmental 
uses are being made. Ecological policy is an interacting part of a 
generally interdependence system, both a dependent and indepen-
dent variable; and "costs" reflect specific patterns of interdepen-
dence which are themselves contingent and neither permanent nor 
absolute. 
I should make clear that there are at least two important 
relevant psychological aspects of costs. First, psychological values 
are costs when they are adversely affected by, say, production. The 
policy problem is: whose psychological values are to be protected? 
Second, social action-including remedial and preventive environ-
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mental protection policy--depends upon complex processes of 
perception of costs, which is itself partially dependent upon power 
(and thus also upon class and economic interest group) structure. 
While we wish to consider costs in designing and managing 
ecological systems, costs are thus no simple matter. Costs-whose 
interests are to count as costs-are themselves a critical variable 
in a system of general interdependence, a proxy for temporary 
solutions to choice problems reached in a dynamic system. Costs 
-for example, actual market prices-are used in a partial inter-
dependence manner only with several implicit qualifications; the 
fact that it is easier or only possible to use them in partial inter-
dependence ways does not alter their highly constrained significance 
nor does it obviate the implicit policy making involved through 
their use. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURE VERSUS RESULTS 
Most discussions of environmental policy jump from considera-
tion of decision making or control systems to consideration of 
specific policies or results. In a general interdependence context 
it is undoubtedly necessary to be concerned with both, but it is 
difficult to work with or to specify at the same time; hence discus-
sions shift from one to the other, making analysis difficult to handle, 
communicate, and conclude. In any case, the treatment of one 
requires the making of assumptions about the other, something 
which has not always been clear. 
What is the relationship(s) between designed structure and 
operating results? In the design of environmental systems are we 
interested in erecting decisional structures or in the decisional 
results? Is the ecologist satisfied with a system that will consider 
environmental factors or does he insist upon certain ecological 
results? 
The problem of design and management is to set up control 
systems to effectuate ecological policy. The control systems can be 
designed to effectuate certain particular ecological ends or they 
can be designed to themselves select the ecological ends. The ends 
which each designed system tends to produce will be different. Is 
the structure to be designed to produce particular results, and if 
so then what (whose) results, that is, who chooses ecological trade-
offs? Or is the structure to be designed in terms of principles of (or-
ganizational) design independent of ecological tradeoffs with the 
understanding that whatever results are produced by the designed 
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structure are presumptively optimal, and if so, then by what 
(whose) principles of (organizational) design? Is structure to be 
evaluated by results or by structural criteria; or, are results to be 
evaluated by structural criteria or by criteria of results? The prob-
lem is analogous to this the following: given that decisions are a 
product of decision-making structure and process, are decisions to 
be evaluated in terms of criteria independent of decisional struc-
ture and process or are decisional structure and process to be evalu-
ated in terms of criteria independent of decisional results; or, 
does structure justify results or do results justify structure? These 
and related questions can be asked ex ante (with regard to design) 
and ex post (with regard to evaluation of operation). 
The actual social solution to particular instances of this problem 
is a result in each case of the operation of the system of general 
interdependence as outlined above. The ecologist or other en-
vironmentalist usually is interested in both structure and results 
but typically does not have control or influence in regard to both 
and typically also is preoccupied with one or the other. What is at 
stake is the substance to be given to ecological optimality: ecological 
optimally involves the making of a complex set of decisions about 
environmental use patterns and associated tradeoffs, but decisions 
depend upon decision-making structure and environmental limits. 
Any particular ecologist, in specifying desirable or needed environ-
mental results, is making certain tradeoffs and not others, and any 
decisional structure and process will make certain tradeoffs and 
not others; whichever are optimal will depend upon the weighting 
and choices made by the decision-making process subject to en-
vironmental limits. The environmentalist is probably only rarely 
able to predict how the larger society will choose as between eco-
logical alternatives; more typically, the environmentalist has his 
own particular alternative in mind, whatever his set of allegiances 
to various interests. Should policy and policy recommendations be 
directed to structure or to results; is ecosystem results-particular 
ecological policies-the goal, or is ecosystem control systems-and 
whatever ecological tradeoffs they make-the goal? This is the 
fun~amental problem typically begged in ecosystem policy dis-
CUSSIons. 
An important subsidiary problem involves the question of ab-
solute versus relative environmental limits. How absolute are the 
ecosystem mass-energy, metabolic, physical-chemical, and other 
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parameters? Is there only one optimal environmental policy in 
each case and that one given by ecological theory and fact alone? 
Or is there an opportunity-set array of possible alternative environ-
mental policies with optimality depending upon the tradeoffs made 
by the extant decision-making structure; and if so, which if any 
alternatives are ruled out by environmental limits-and what is 
the meaning of "ruled out?" Is the expertise of the ecologist or 
other specialist going to make or govern ecological policy, because 
of the absolute limits which their skills enable them to discern; or 
is the decision making process or structure-such as politics, 
market, or other collective decision or social choice institutions-
going to have the opportunity arid the burden of making and 
selecting environmental tradeoffs? Is the use of the Alaskan North 
Shore determined by environmental limits or by the expertise of 
the ecologist, solely or in part and if so which part? Or is that use 
going to require the balancing of the relative merits of ecological 
and other considerations (and therefore choosing between alterna-
tive cost configurations and distributions), with the expertise of 
the ecologist and others serving as one input to identify critical 
variables and alternatives and tradeoffs, with the ultimate decision 
depending upon the structure of power governing whose interests 
are to be counted and given effect? Somewhere, somehow, such 
questions have to be answered, and will be answered as part of a 
general interdependence system. What is the balance between 
ecological optimality being dependent upon the power structure 
and being dependent upon environmental or ecological limits? And 
who is to say? 
The problem is which ecological tradeoffs are to be made. The 
actual social solution will be forthcoming from and as a product 
of the general interdependence system. The environmentalist 
wants to develop regulatory systems and to make them responsive 
to ecological needs. But which needs and whose needs, insofar as 
mankind has a choice? Whose values are to be counted in making 
choices between ecological tradeoffs and use-alternatives? Whose 
interests are to be counted as costs in evaluating alternatives? All 
this is complicated by the fact that the cost-price structure and 
power structure are constantly changing, that is, they are themselves 
dependent variables; not only is the environment undergoing a 
continuing complex organic evolution but so also is society. The 
ecosystem policy maker, accordingly, has to be seen as a participant 
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in a complex process of choice, as one factor in a system of general 
interdependence. More important, ecological ends are themselves 
to no small degree dependent upon the same system of general 
interdependence. The complex sets of causal chains and symbiotic 
relations found in the ecosystem or biosphere must be juxtaposed to 
the complex structure and process of social choice and its open-
endedness. To existential scarcity (not always honored by those 
who have treated the environment as a free good to mankind) must 
be added not only the data of the existential environment but also 
existential choice. 
V. THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
As an economist interested in the analysis of environmental 
and decision-making problems, I am personally desirous of neither 
defending nor criticizing the work of either economists or eco-
logists. If I have pointed to the limits of ecological analysis, I 
have also pointed to the limits of economic analysis. In both cases, 
knowledge of the limits of disciplinary analysis in the real world 
of policy making would inform and improve that analysis. 
So far as economic analysis is concerned, it is clear, first, that 
market valuation of costs and benefits is specific to the status quo 
distribution of power, including legal rights and wealth. It is the 
structure of power, broadly considered, which governs whose inter-
ests are to count in the dollar voting of the market. Similar state-
ments could be made of political decision making. Second, the 
usual view by the economist, and it is very important as far as it 
goes, is that negative externalities, such as pollution, arise because 
the waste disposal capacity of the environment is allowed to be 
used without any or without adequate attribution of costs. But the 
deeper questions are: which costing, whose costs are to count, 
whose interests are to count as others' costs? Externalities, properly 
understood, are ubiquitous. It is impossible to eliminate all ex-
ternalities; rather it is necessary to evaluate and choose between 
externalities, which choice will itself involve externalities. The 
problem is ultimately a distributional one: whose interests are to 
count, whose to be sacrificed, and who is to decide? Concentration 
upon allocative efficiency typically tends to beg these questions. 
Economic analysis can identify the critical variables and alterna-
tives and can study how society chooses but economists can no more 
properly than ecologists preempt the decisional process by intro-
ducing their own norms and goals. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Ecosystem design and management must be seen as entering into 
a system of general interdependence in which the very existence 
and magnitude of basic variables depend upon the interplay of a 
changing host of factors and are ultimately problematic and 
stochastic in the sense of being made rather than comprising some-
thing to be discovered and applied. They are made in the very 
process of our trying to appreh.end them. 
This is conspicuously the case with "costs." Costs are no less 
relative and artifactual than the ecological alternatives chosen by 
social institutions such as market and government. When we con-
sider the problem of structure versus results we perceive that the 
quintessence of the process in which both structure and results 
are produced in our attempts to apprehend them is ultimately 
choice. The environmentalist is making choices even when he is 
passively and unknowingly adopting and effectuating the choices 
embodied in the cost-price structure. Social policy is choice with 
regard to society's opportunity set of alternatives and tradeoffs, 
however the choosing process is disaggregated and structured. The 
ecologist, not unlike the economist, has important and distinctive 
inputs for that choosing process, but his role will be but one among 
many, even with respect to specifically ecological issues-for not 
all ecologists (any more than economists) agree and even when they 
agree they are not the only ones relevant to the selection between 
environmental tradeoffs. When the ecologist attempts to specify 
ecosystem policy he is attempting to invoke his preference function 
alone, and, regardless of what we think of that, he is making very 
important but inconclusive assumptions about whose interests 
are to count as costs to others and about the problem of structure 
versus results. All discussion of ecosystem policy must come to 
grips with the problems of costs and structure versus results; 
choices are made with respect to them even when they are not 
recognized as such. 
Ultimately, then, ecosystem policy, or the design and manage-
ment of environmental systems, is involved with the formation and 
use of power in society, for it is power which distinctively deter-
mines costs and the choice of environmental alternatives and the 
choice of environmental alternatives and the corresponding dis-
tribution of costs will influence the distribution of power in society. 
Ecosystem policy recommendations make or carry assumptions-
explicit or implicit-about the structure and use of power, 
596 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
ultimately with respect to who will make what fundamental deci-
sions or choices. A systems-analytic ecology must comprehend the 
impact of the problem of power if it is to understand what it 
itself is all about, both as science and as policy discipline. 
-.~.-
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